Abstract-The future energy grid is expected to be a decentralized network where household units acting as agents can trade energy with others within local neighborhoods by means of an action mechanism. When agents can establish their own price of energy, it is essential to analyze the auction from a market equilibrium standpoint. This paper provides a proof that such a mechanism, although previously formulated as a gradient ascent algorithm to maximize the welfare (i.e. the sum of the utilities of all the agents), converges to the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) under physical grid operating constraints, where no agent is incentivized to deviate from its bid. The theoretical analysis is accompanied by simulations of a modified IEEE 37 node system showing convergence towards the equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the increasing penetration of renewable energy resources, the electrical energy distribution system is expected to undergo a transformation from a centralized grid to a decentralized system that operates on market conditions [1] - [3] . Domestic units, i.e. households that utilize energy are equipped with their own renewable energy resources and are sometimes willing to sell surplus generated energy to the grid. Under these circumstances the role of a DSO (distribution system operator) is to ensure that the available energy is distributed in an efficient manner, while the energy grid's physical constraints, such as voltage deviation, transformer capacity and line power limits are within acceptable limits.
A recently proposed market-based approach models the domestic energy consuming units as prosumer agents. These agents can either buy or sell energy through a lower level auction mechanism [4] - [7] . The auction is conducted by an aggregator, which can directly communicate within agents within its physical neighborhood in the grid. The aggregator implements the mechanism as an iterative double auction involving prosumer agents that can act either as buyers or sellers. The auction incorporates asymmetric bidding where some agents receive the unit cost of energy from the aggregator and bid the total amount of energy they wish to trade Corresponding author: Sanjoy Das (email: sdas@ksu.edu).
(power bidders), whereas other agents are assigned by the aggregator, the amount of energy that they can trade, and place as bids unit costs (cost bidders). Other similar algorithmic mechanisms have been proposed recently in smart grid research [8] - [11] . At the upper level, the physical grid incorporates a trading mechanism between the DSO and the aggregators. The overall auction is therefore a bilevel mechanism. The DSO operates in a power setting mode, where it allocates the amount of energy that each aggregator can receive or send to the DSO. The double auction taking place within each aggregator establishes a different unit cost within its own agents, which is returned to the DSO. The entire process is repeated until the upper level algorithm converges to an optimum.
The net energy requirement is submitted by the DSO to the upstream ISO, and separately for each hour for dayahead energy scheduling. It has been shown in [7] that the overall bilevel mechanism is efficient, i.e. that it maximizes the sum of the utilities of all prosumer agents in the grid.
II. STRATEGIES

A. Prosumer Agents
The prosumer units interact with the grid as selfish agents. The objective of each such agent is to maximize its payoff (•) , which is the difference between the utility gained from consuming energy and the cost of procuring it. The strategy of agent being served by aggregator can be cast as the following optimization problem:
In the above expression, (•) is a utility function that is assumed to be strictly concave and increasing, is the amount of energy obtained from the aggregator, and is the agent's local energy generation (see Fig. 1 ). The quantity is the unit cost of energy. Where needed it will be assumed that the local feasibility constraint, + = 0 is not violated. Hence, the prosumer bidding strategy reduces to unconstrained maximization of its payoff as shown above in (1) .
Differentiating the expression with respect to energy , we have
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The above expression shows that the optimal bidding strategy is to place bids so that the agent's marginal utility is equal to the unit cost. This is illustrated for buying and selling agents in Fig. 1 . 
B. Aggregators
The set of all aggregators in the grid is denoted as . Each aggregator ∈ contains a set of prosumer agents . Moreover, and are the sets of agents in that sell and buy energy, so that ∪ = and ∩ = ∅. It is assumed for simplicity that agents in are power bidders while those in are cost bidders. Each aggregator receives the total energy that the DSO allocates to it, and after conducting its own lower level auction, returns the equilibrium cost back to the aggregator (see Fig. 2 ). The aggregator's strategy is outlined in Algorithm-1 as shown below. In Algorithm-1, [ ] ∈ is the column vector of dimension | | whose th entry is which is the amount of energy received by the corresponding agent ∈ . This convention is followed throughout the remainder of this paper.
The quantity is the unit cost of energy reimbursed to each agent ∈ . The aggregator sends the unit cost to all agents in and receives their power bids from agents that are willing to sell. The agents are then labeled as buyers or sellers and placed in or accordingly. The total power − | | T [ ] ∈ that the aggregator is estimated to receive during that iteration, is then allocated to each designated buyer ∈ , in proportion to the total monetary amount that it is willing to spend for procurement. This quantity is sent to the buying agents in , which respond by communicating to the aggregator, their unit cost bids, . The ratio of the total monetary amount to be procured from the buyers to the energy available from the grid and through the sellers, is the new unit cost .
Algorithm-1 can be viewed as fixed point iteration as shown in Fig. 3 . The red curve is the aggregate supply From Algorithm-1, Clearly the following conditions hold when the auction terminates at the optimum, 
Lemma-1: At the auction's convergence, all agents in , including those in are charged with the same unit cost .
Proof: From (3),
Hence all are equal for ∈ . From (4), = .
Lemma-2: Energy balance is satisfied at auction equilibrium.
Proof: This lemma has been established earlier [7] and repeated here for convenience. Replacing all with in (4),
Hence, the total power delivered to the agents in (which is negative for sellers) is equal to the external power received.
The aggregator welfare of each aggregator is the sum of the utilities of all agents in so that,
In the above, = [ ] ∈ . It is established below that the aggregator auction mechanism maximizes the welfare under the constraint that the total energy provided to agents, | | T does not exceed the energy that it receives from the DSO. In other words, Algorithm-1 solves the following constrained optimization problem (COP), 
Lemma-3: Given and , the aggregator auction's equilibrium maximizes the welfare Θ ( ) [7] .
Proof: With being a dual variable, the Lagrangian of the COP in (6) is given by,
The stationary condition of (7) for each agent ∈ is, = .
Since Θ (•) is the sum of strictly concave functions, the COP in (6) has a unique maximum, which satisfies (9) . Comparing (4) with (9), establishes Lemma-3 with = .
C. DSO
The DSO receives the vector = [ ] ∈ of unit costs from the aggregators and provides the energy amounts specified by the vector = [ ] ∈ . In doing so, it must not violate the physical grid constraints. Suppose the grid constraints are represented as the vector of inequalities ( ) ≤ , Algorithm-2 below shows the various steps of the DSO mechanism.
Algorithm-2: DSO Mechanism
Repeat:
Receive from aggregators: . ← Gradient step: 
The following lemma illustrates how Algorithm-2 implements gradient descent towards the optimal value of .
Lemma-4:
The total welfare is maximized at the bilevel mechanism's optimum.
Proof: From (6) it is seen that,
But using (3) and (9),
HENCE,
The vector of unit costs that Algorithm-1 converges to provides the gradient direction for Algorithm-2. The DSO MECHANISM in Algorithm-2 is a straightforward implementation of projected gradient ascent where is the gradient direction [12] , [13] .
III. GAME THEORETIC FORMULATION
A. Generalized Nash Equilibrium
Consider a game ( , , ) , where is a set of selfish agents, and for every ∈ , its action is in the
→ ℜ is its payoff function. Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) extends this concept by constraining the set of actions available to each agent to be dependent on the actions − of all other agents [14] . Hence, we may write, ∈ ( − ).
With ≜ [ ] ∈ and ∇ ≜ [∇ ] ∈ , the GNE conditions can be expressed in the following manner.
∀ ∈ , ∀ ∈ ( − ), ∇ ( * )( − * ) ≥ 0.
The above GNE condition can be shown to reduce to the following quasi-variational inequality ( , ∇ ) [16] (also see Fig. 4 ), 
B. Aggregator Equilibrium
A game ( , , ) can be defined at each aggregator, where using (7) the set of feasible actions is given be the following expression.
The GNE of at each aggregator is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem-1: The aggregator mechanism in Algorithm-1 establishes GNE.
Proof: Let * be the equilibrium energy consumptions of the agents and ∈ ∏ another feasible vector of consumptions. From (2),
Using (5), the above is equivalent to the expression below.
Since is feasible, | | T ≤ , whence from the above,
Upon comparing the above expression with (12), clearly Algorithm-1 is a solution to ( , ∇ ). This proves that Algorithm-1 establishes GNE.
C. DSO Equilibrium
Consider the game DSO ( , ℱ, Θ ) . It will now be established that * is the GNE solution by means of the following theorem.
Theorem-2:
The DSO mechanism in Algorithm-2 establishes GNE.
Proof: Since it has been shown that Algorithm-1 maximizes Θ using its allocated power , we consider it to be a function of the latter and indicate this as Θ ( ).
Let the following expression be the solution of the constrained optimization problem in (10) that is arrived at by Algorithm-2. * = rg x
Next, let ∈ ℱ be another feasible allocation of power to the aggregators. Since * solves the constrained optimization problem in (10), according to the minimum principle, ∇ ( * ) T ( * − ) ≥ 0 (16) Hence * is a solution to (ℱ, ∇ ). In other words, it is at GNE.
Other approaches to obtain GNE are provided in [15] , which may be considered as an alternative approach where the feasibility constraints are included as an augmented penalty term in the Lagrangian.
IV. RESULTS & CONCLUSION
A modified IEEE 37 node system has been used to simulate the proposed bilevel mechanism [7] (see Fig. 5 ). The system contains 17 aggregators.
A set of agents were randomly generated for each aggregator. A total of 483 agents with 303 buyers and 180 sellers, each with its own utility curve and generation was generated. Four scenarios, labeled I, II, III, and IV were created with increasing price levels [7] . The result of the application of Algorithm-2 with each aggregator executing a local copy of Algorithm-1 is provided in Fig.  6 . The convergence towards GNE is clearly observed. Prior research work in [7] has already shown the effectiveness of the auction mechanism discussed here. However, it was not specifically shown that the approach converges towards the GNE. In proving this result, this research shows that the algorithm converges towards the efficient optimum that is also stable from a market standpoint, where no agent would arbitrarily change its declared bid.
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